Re: [Hampshire] Securely deleting files

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Author: Hugo Mills
Date:  
To: Hampshire LUG Discussion List
Subject: Re: [Hampshire] Securely deleting files

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gpg: failed to create temporary file '/var/lib/lurker/.#lk0x57dbb100.hantslug.org.uk.11639': Permission denied
gpg: keyblock resource '/var/lib/lurker/pubring.gpg': Permission denied
gpg: Signature made Thu Mar 8 19:51:29 2007 GMT
gpg: using DSA key B2C27BC21C335860
gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
On Thu, Mar 08, 2007 at 07:17:53PM -0000, john eayrs wrote:
> One of the reasons I like fat32 or fat16 is that it is very easy to
> overwrite files before deletion. I can overwrite file names so that file
> names cannot be traced. Ie My sensitive documents on a technical
> publication on a comercial sensitive subject is removed when the job
> producing a technical manual for a company is finished.
>
> On a linux file system there appears to a system log of the documentation


"System log of the documentation"?

Most modern (i.e. journalling) filesystems enhance metadata
integrity by writing changes to the disk to a "journal" before
enabling those changes in an atomic manner. If the power to the disk
fails before the change can be completed, the journal can be replayed
to ensure that the filesystem remains in a consistent state. The
result of this functionality is that you can't guarantee that the
blocks currently allocated to a file will always be the same -- but
then I don't think you could guarantee that on older systems anyway.

> and the possibility of files being moved around on the hard disk in order
> to have more efficient use of hard disk space.


If a file is written to the disk, then it won't get moved unless
it's re-written (i.e. by a newer copy of the file). In that case, the
blocks owned by the file may get changed -- as they could do on a FAT
filesystem.

> On some word processors backup files are automatically created of data which
> can make it difficult to guarentee complete removal of commercially
> sensitive data when a job is finished.


This happens with many applications, not necessarily just under
Linux, or just with word processors.

> If I created an encrypted drive using "TrueCrypt" with a FAT32 filesystem
> for sensitive information would this mean that no system log of the filename
> is kept and when I overwrite the file with random bytes no trace of the data
> is left. It is possible to request that a word processor creates its
> temporary files in the "TrueCrypt" encrypted drive.


> Will the above work on a linux system or is it "pie in the sky".


This is exactly what encrypted filesystems under Linux are.

Hugo.

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=== Hugo Mills: hugo@... carfax.org.uk | darksatanic.net | lug.org.uk ===
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